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The Internationalized Contract and the
Populist Backlash to the Fine Print
ERICK MARQUINA†

I. INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that sovereign States are wary of investor-state
dispute settlement (“ISDS”)1 through which foreign investors, namely
multinational corporations (“MNCs”), can unilaterally compel
binding arbitration for violations of bilateral investment treaty
(“BITs”) obligations, often through treaty shopping.2 A powerful
example of how far those obligations and treaty shopping can extend
is the “internationalized” contract, which arises whenever a foreign
investor uses a signatory host state’s BIT terms, such as umbrella
clauses and Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”) language, to
broaden the treaty’s protections to encompass a purely domestic
transaction.3 In an international legal arena governed by principles of
© 2020 Erick Marquina.
†
J.D. Candidate (2021), University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law. The author thanks his editors, Stuart Davis and Danielle Schweizer, for their
enthusiastic and welcomed guidance, as well as their dedicated feedback. He also
thanks Professors William Moon and Peter Danchin for their final comments and
suggestions, which proved paramount in polishing this Comment. Lastly, the author
dedicates this Comment to his mother, father, and brother, for their unyielding love
and support.
1. Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better Alternative?,
43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 639, 649-50, 658-59 (2018) (discussing criticisms from United
States conservatives who argue that ISDS will undermine United States’ sovereignty by
giving international arbitrators a role typically reserved for domestic courts, as well as
opposition from other countries, such as Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and India); see
generally Dani Rodrick, Populism and the economics of globalization, J. INT’L. BUS. POLICY
(Dec.
2018),
https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/danirodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf.
2. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 233, 275-83
(2015).
3. See id. at 249.
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sovereignty and consent,4 the internationalized contract and its
underlying mechanics sparked a populist backlash from many States
that once tolerated the scope of BIT protections.5 Two questions
arise in this context: (1) Does the internationalized contract and its
mechanisms warrant such a strong populist backlash? (2) Will the
internationalized contract as a doctrine survive this populist
backlash? This Article’s answer to both questions is no and likely
not, respectively.6
Understanding the internationalized contract necessarily requires
understanding the international legal world in which it was born. Part
II introduces that world’s background by discussing BITs,
international investment law, ISDS, International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), the internationalized
contract from a doctrinal perspective, and the populist backlash to
those underlying mechanisms.7 Then, Part III argues that States see
the internationalized contract and its mechanisms as an impermissible
encroachment on sovereignty, which gave rise to a populist
backlash.8 This Article analyzes the merits of that backlash and
argues that the internationalized contract will likely not remain in
place if populist States continue their backlash.9 Lastly, Part IV
concludes by arguing that the internationalized contract, though
powerful, is a fairly limited doctrine that itself is subject to sovereign
forces that States already possess, which suggests that its days are
numbered.10
II. BACKGROUND
The internationalized contract is a doctrinal merger between
international law’s powerful protections for foreign investments and
domestic contract law.11 Those protections manifest through BITs
and international investment law, which govern transactions between
4. See Anna Cavnar, The Foreign Office Model versus the Global Governance Model:
An Introduction, INST. INT’L L. JUST., 2-3, (Dec. 17, 2019), http://iilj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/Cavnar-The-Foreign-Office-Model-Versus-the-GlobalGovernance-Model-2008.pdf.
5. Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON
POL., 1 (June 20, 2019).
6. Infra Part III(D).
7. Infra Part II.
8. Infra Part III.
9. Id.
10. Infra Part IV.
11. Infra Part II(C).
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foreign investors, such as MNCs, and host states.12 Any disputes
arising from transactions protected within the ambit of BITs are
adjudicated through ISDS in international tribunals, such as ICSID.13
ICSID as a tribunal determines whether BIT protections reach certain
transactions and, if so, to what extent.14 Various cases demonstrate
that domestic contracts and those underlying obligations can
themselves come under the aegis of BIT protections, which gives rise
to internationalized contracts.15 Those broad protections strike
strongly in favor of foreign investors and against the host state,
whose sovereign interests in regulating markets within its territory
must often yield to BIT enforcement through ISDS.16 Recently,
States have voiced their concerns over what they see as a gross
encroachment on sovereignty and the voice of the State’s people.17
Those voices, though not new, recently became salient once more
States expressed their frustrations with the current MNC-favored
regime, which led to a populist backlash against the doctrine and its
mechanisms.18
A. Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Investment
BITs are agreements between two sovereign States that “protect
investment by investors of one state in the territory of another state
by articulating substantive rules governing the host state’s treatment
of the investment and by establishing dispute resolution mechanisms
applicable to alleged violations of those rules.”19 BIT rules generally
come in two forms: negative obligations, which impose a duty on a
government to not act, and a positive obligation, which imposes an
affirmative duty on a government to defend the investor from threat
or hardship.20 From 1959 to 2002, nearly 2200 individual BITs
formed, which makes the BIT one of the most widely used form of
international agreement for protecting foreign investments.21
12. Infra Part II(A).
13. Infra Part II(B).
14. Id.
15. Infra Part II(C).
16. Infra Part II(B).
17. Infra Part II(D).
18. Id.
19. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 469, 469-70 (2000).
20. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 417, 421 (2006)
21. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do Bits Really Work?: An Evaluation
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 67
(2005)
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A BIT’s purpose is twofold: “to stimulate the reciprocal flow of
investment between countries and to afford both countries legal
protection in either jurisdiction.”22 BITs come with a variety of titles,
such as “treaties,” “conventions,” and “agreements,” but an important
point is that they fall within the definition of “treaty” under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.23 In terms of definitions
under a BIT, an “investor” is a natural person or legal entity making
the investment in the territory of the other party.24 However, an
“investment” has no fixed definition.25 However, an investment can
generally include “assets or inputs in money or services, which is
invested or reinvested in a sector of economic activity.”26
Regarding investments, international investment law is primarily
focused on foreign direct investment (“FDI”), that is, “the transfer of
tangible or intangible assets from one country into another for the
purpose of use in that country to generate wealth under the total or
partial control of the owner of the assets.”27 FDIs involve two states:
22. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 257-58 (1994). At this point, note that there is vast
literature discussing the scope of BITs, ISDS as a process, ICSID as a forum, and general
criticisms the spawned from those international legal instruments. This Article will avoid
any superfluous and idiosyncratic analysis of these subjects primarily to avoid diluting its
main point, which is the underlying internationalized contract doctrine and a populist
response therefrom. See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, DO BITS
REALLY WORK?: AN EVALUATION OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND
THEIR GRAND BARGAIN. 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67 (2005).
23. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 257 (1994); Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT) (defining “treaty” as an
“international agreement, concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation;”) (emphasis added).
24. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 259 (1994).
25. Infra Part II(C). In fact, the definition of an “investment” is at the heart of the
internationalized contract doctrine because tribunals dealing with this doctrine ultimately
must decide whether the foreign investor’s domestic contract is an “investment” protected
under the BIT. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award ¶
299 (holding that a BIT’s umbrella clause offers international remedies for State contractual
violations). But see SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Rep. of Pak.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406,
P161 (2005) (refusing to extend BIT protections to a domestic contractual violation absent
an express provision in the treaty permitting such a protection).
26. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 259 (1994). Some treaties go further to explicitly
describe various types of investments. Id. The “majority of agreements” typically outline the
following: “stocks, credits, securities, real estate, and personal property, in rem assets,
intellectual property rights, prospecting, extraction or developing of natural resources,
including public law concessions, etc.” Id.
27. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
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one “home” state, where the investor maintains its nationality,” and
one “host” state, where the investments are physically located.28 As
with any transaction, FDIs provide benefits and costs for involved
parties.29 Benefits for the host state can include: (1) an influx of
wealth for local producers supplying goods or services to investors;
(2) new local jobs; and (3) development of physical infrastructure
through new and superior technology from investors.30 However,
consequences may include: (1) corruption; (2) environmental
degradation; and (3) displacement of local competitors.31 The most
relevant consequence for this Article’s purposes is that the
substantive rules protecting FDI can “encroach on the host state’s
sovereignty.”32
This “encroachment” lies at the heart of the BIT’s protections of
foreign investments and enforcement process.33 An aggrieved party
who believes the other party violated a protected transaction under
the BIT may seek redress in the host state’s domestic courts.34
Additionally, aggrieved foreign investors, such as MNCs, may
initiate arbitration proceedings in an international tribunal pursuant to
provisions within the BIT.35 However, foreign investors often faced
judicial bias in favor of the host state when the investor attempted to
seek remedy in the host state’s domestic courts.36 Accordingly,
contemporary arbitrations are frequently heard before ICSID, “an
institution within the World Bank Group formed in 1966 to conduct
and promote [ISDS].”37

Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 406-07 (2006).
28. Id. at 407. These FDIs often take the form of investors, such as MNCs, purchasing
and developing productive facilities, such as factories, mines, drilling platforms, or offices.
Id. These investments can also include ownership of subsidiary corporations within the host
state. Id.
29. Id. at 408.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 408-09 (2006)
33. See id. at 416.
34. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 265 (1994). The host state is the country in whose
territory the investment was made. Id.
35. Id.
36. Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better Alternative?,
43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 640 (2018).
37. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 415 (2006).
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B. Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Two interrelated solutions arose around the 1960s to combat
biases foreign investors faced in trying to enforce their agreements in
host state’s domestic courts—an international forum through ICSID
and the arbitration mechanism of ISDS.38 Proposals at the United
Nations sought to resolve disputes between host nations and foreign
investors under international law, which contradicted sovereign views
that domestic law governed those agreements.39 After a series of
proposals and debates, members of the World Bank established the
ICSID Convention in 1965 with the goal of providing conciliation
and arbitration facilities to resolve international investment disputes.40
The ICSID Convention entered into force in 1966 after the first 20
States ratified it, and it is currently ratified by 154 Contracting
States.41 This treaty created ICSID, an institution committed to
resolving disputes between countries and international investors.42
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides that “the jurisdiction of
the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an
investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national of another
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing
to submit to the Centre.”43 Though this language did not define how
to give written consent, consent through BITs became standard
practice.44 Lastly, States that are party to the ICSID Convention are
“bound to comply with any award issued against them by an ICSID
arbitral tribunal, and to enforce such awards made against other host

38. See Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better
Alternative?, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 639-45 (2018).
39. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 48-49 (2009).
40. Roderick Abbott, Fredrik Erixon & Martina Francesca Ferracane, Demystifying
Investor- State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), EUROPEAN CTR. FOR INT’L POLITICAL ECON., 5,
https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/OCC52014__1.pdf (last visited Dec. 17,
2019).
41. ICSID
Convention,
THE
WORLD
BANK
GROUP,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Convention.aspx (lasted visited Dec.
17, 2019).
42. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States art. 1, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 182.
43. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 194. Under Article
25, “[w]hen the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally.” CAN THIS BE A SHORT CITE?
44. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 56 (2009).
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states.”45
On the other hand, ISDS is the legal mechanism that “allows
[MNCs] a forum, other than the court system of the country in which
the dispute arose . . ., to arbitrate a controversy between a corporation
and the host country.”46 ISDS provides foreign corporations an
opportunity to be heard in a fair and neutral manner by allowing both
parties to appoint arbitrators.47 In order for MNCs to gain access to
ISDS, there must be an underlying treaty negotiated by the host
country’s government and the country in which the MNC is
incorporated, which is where the BITs enter the fray.48 Host
countries may also statutorily provide an ISDS tribunal jurisdiction
over a dispute or by contracting for that forum with the investor.49
Regardless of the method, States now give ex ante consent for foreign
investors to have the exclusive right to bring a claim before an
international tribunal.50 In contrast, any State government seeking
relief against a foreign investor or other domestic corporation seeking
relief against their home State must rely on domestic courts for their
claims.51 It is through these mechanisms—ICSID as a forum and
ISDS clauses within BITs as the pathway to that forum—that
internationalized contracts can exist.52
C. The Internationalized Contract
An internationalized contract is a domestic contract that is
legally considered an “investment” that falls within the ambit of a
BIT’s umbrella clause or FET language, which grants that contract
international legal protection under the treaty itself.53 In essence, the
internationalization doctrine is a merger between international law’s
strong protections for foreign property and domestic contracts.54
BITs by their nature incorporate broad standards aimed at
protecting foreign property from undue interference by the host
45. Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 403, 415 (2006).
46. Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better Alternative?,
43 Brook. J. Int’l L. 639, 639 (2018). Later, in 1959, the first ISDS clause emerged from a
bilateral trade agreement between Germany and Pakistan. Id. at 647.
47. Id. at 639.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 639-40.
52. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 260 (2015).
53. See id.
54. Id.
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state.55 Though these standards rarely differed in textual substance
from domestic contracts, tribunals regularly expanded the ambit of
BIT guarantees.56 Tribunals tend to expand treaty protection for
transnational property to cover the total field of possible state
action.57 In practice, this meant that state action at all levels,
including legislative, executive, or judicial, and regulatory domains
such as taxation to public health to environmental regulations were
not free from international scrutiny so long as they affected foreign
property.58 Not only did tribunals tackle direct takings and State
regulatory efforts to destroy the investment’s economic value,
tribunals also required compensating for partial takings and the
simple diminution of an investment’s value. As the ICSID case,
CMS Gas v. Argentina, reveals, domestic contracts fall well within
the scope of foreign property.59
In CMS Gas v. Argentina, an American investor, CMS, claimed
that its host state destroyed the value of a gas transportation
concession operated by its local subsidiary.60 CMS argued that this
loss directly violated its domestic License contract with Argentina
and, therefore, fell within the ambit of the Argentina-U.S. BIT’s
umbrella clause.61 Additionally, CMS argued that Argentina violated
the BIT’s FET provision when it left CMS’s investment in an
unpredictable and unstable condition.62 While Argentina argued that
it enacted a series of regulatory measures to manage its on-going
financial crisis, the tribunal held that the regulations partially vitiated
the value of CMS’s investment and so the State must compensate
them accordingly.63 In viewing a domestic contract as an investment,
CMS Gas v. Argentina exemplified how internationalized contracts
function as a merger of international property protections and
domestic contract principles.64 By considering Argentina’s violation
of CMS’s contract as tantamount to treaty violation, ICSID
55. See id. at 260.
56. Id. at 261.
57. Id.
58. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 261 (2015).
59. See generally CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award (May 21, 2005).
60. Id. at ¶¶ 68-73.
61. Id. at ¶ 296. This umbrella clause provided that each party “shall observe any
obligation it may have entered into with regard to an investment.”
62. Id. at ¶¶ 266-67. This BIT’s FET provision provides: “Investment shall at all times
be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in
no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law.”
63. Id. at ¶ 281.
64. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 260-61 (2015).
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internationalized the relevant domestic contract.65
Notably, CMS Gas v. Argentina also provides an example of
how ICSID interprets both primary methods of internationalizing a
contract—umbrella clauses and the FET.66 ICSID held that domestic
contract breaches are likely protected under umbrella clauses when
there is “significant interference by governments or public agencies
with the rights of the investor.”67 Additionally, ICSID held that the
FET, though vague as it is in most BITs, requires host states to ensure
investments maintain stability and predictability to protect the
legitimate expectations of investors.68
1. Umbrella Clauses
As CMS Gas shows, one of the primary methods through which
domestic contracts gain international legal effect is through umbrella
clauses.69 In essence, umbrella clause are contractual clauses within
BITs that purport to include contractual claims within the “umbrella”
of a BIT’s protections.70 Normally, mere contractual violations
cannot trigger treaty protection under customary international law,
umbrella clauses attempt to circumvent this tradition through explicit
statements that breaches of contract will be considered breaches of
treaty as well.71 In doing so, an umbrella clause can elevate a
violation of a contractual provision to an independent international
law violation, and, thus, provide foreign investors access to
international institutions to resolve their disputes.72 This method
“extends the public international law principle of pacta sunt servanda
to commercial contracts with States by transforming contractual
obligations into obligations under the applicable investment treaty.”73
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award at ¶ 299.
68. See id. at ¶¶ 279-81.
69. Andrey V. Kuznetsov, The Limits of Contractual Stabilization Clauses for
Protecting International Oil and Gas Investments Examined Through the Prism of the
Sakhalin-2PSA: Mandatory Law, the Umbrella Clause, and the Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard, 22 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 223, 250 (2015).
70. Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment
Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1006 (2011).
71. Id.
72. Andrey V. Kuznetsov, The Limits of Contractual Stabilization Clauses for
Protecting International Oil and Gas Investments Examined Through the Prism of the
Sakhalin-2PSA: Mandatory Law, the Umbrella Clause, and the Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard, 22 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 223, 250 (2015).
73. Id. at 250-51; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT) (defining “pacta sunt servanda” as a principle where “every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
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Among the roughly 2600 BITs concluded worldwide, about forty
percent include some version of an umbrella clause.74
Umbrella clauses range in scope depending on the BIT in which
they are found.75 They are a regular feature of investment treaties and
call for the observance of the obligations entered into by the host
State.76 Umbrella clauses grant subject-matter jurisdiction that can
relate merely from investments directly dealing with the BIT all the
way to any investment in which the State is engaged.77 Hence, an
umbrella clause’s ability to internationalize a contract is directly
connected to the scope of its language.78 Broader umbrella clauses
can create international obligations for host states that can elevate
contract breaches.79 For example, language may state that the State
shall “observe any obligation it may have entered to” or “observe any
obligation it has assumed.”80 These are the quintessential umbrella
clauses within BITs.81 A modern example of an umbrella clause is
seen in the multilateral investment treaty, the Energy Treaty Charter,
which provides that “Each Contracting Party shall observe any
obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an
Investor of any other Contracting Party.”82 As most investor
contracts with a foreign sovereign can be characterized as
“investments” for the purposes of the umbrella clauses, violating

faith”).
74. Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment
Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1007 (2011). In
fact, countries regularly and favorably use BITs to solicit foreign investment and to ensure
protection of their citizens who invest abroad. Id. at 1008. Today, BITs typically cover four
substantive issues: (1) “conditions for the admission of foreign investors to the host State;”
(2) “standards of treatment of foreign investors;” (3) “protection against expropriation;” and
(4) “methods for resolving investment disputes.”; id. at 1008-09.
75. OECD, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, in
International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations 101-34,
102 (2008), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/40471535.pdf.
76. Michael Feit, ATTRIBUTION AND THE UMBRELLA CLAUSE – IS THERE A WAY
OUT OF THE DEADLOCK?, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 21, 22 (2012).
77. OECD, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, in
International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations 101-34,
102 (2008), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/40471535.pdf.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Energy Charter Treaty art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, 109. While the
Energy Charter Treaty itself is a multilateral treaty and not a BIT, it is an example of how
umbrella clauses exist in the language of several types of international agreements to create
expansive obligations on Contracting States.
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these domestic contracts becomes tantamount to a treaty violation.83
It is this very broad language that allows MNCs to bring States to
arbitration for contractual, that is “investment,” violations.84
Generally, if an umbrella clause is used to “internationalize” a
contract, the following requirements must be met: (1) “the breach of
contract must be attributable to the state;” and (2) “the breach of
contract must amount to a violation of the umbrella clause.”85 The
idea behind the process is that investors bring claims against host
states when they believe contractual obligations were breached.86
Despite the theoretical scope for umbrella clauses, ICSID is currently
split as how much substantive force these clauses carry.87
As previously mentioned, CMS Gas v. Argentina interpreted the
scope of umbrella clauses broadly.88 In that case, ICSID noted that
purely commercial aspects of contract do not necessarily warrant
umbrella clause protections, but it is enough that the government
interferes with the investor’s rights under the domestic contract.89
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania provides an even broader
interpretation.90 In this case, ICSID expressly stated that a breach of
the domestic contract amounts to a breach of the relevant treaty.91 In
that case, the treaty “internationalized” the domestic contract by
elevating a standard breach of contract to a breach of international
obligations under that same treaty.92
However, ICSID gave an umbrella clause a restrictive
interpretation in SGS v. Pakistan.93 In that case, SGS directly argued
that the umbrella clause elevated all contractual claims to the level of
treaty claims.94 However, ICSID held that as long as the contractual
83. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 250 (2015).
84. Id.
85. Michael Feit, Attribution and the Umbrella Clause – Is There a Way out of the
Deadlock?, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 21, 22-23 (2012).
86. Id. at 22.
87. Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment
Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1007 (2011).
88. See CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award at ¶ 299.
89. Id.
90. See generally Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award
(Oct. 12, 2005).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Rep. of Pak., ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406 (2005).
94. Id. ¶ 98. The Swiss-Pakistani BIT’s umbrella clause stated, “[e]ither Contracting
Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of commitments it has entered into with
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breaches failed to trigger additional protections under the BIT, SGS
could not seek remedy before the tribunal.95 ICSID stated that it
needed a special agreement by the parties to pass judgment on the
contractual claims in that case, but concluded that no such agreement
existed.96
While umbrella clauses carry great potential to elevate domestic
contracts, their effectiveness ultimately depends on ICSID’s
willingness to interpret them broadly.97
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
While both umbrella clauses and the FET are substantive
methods to internationalize contracts, interpretations of FET are more
amorphous and arguably more powerful.98 The FET is a “catch-all
autonomous standard of protection found in BITs that address a
variety of unjust governmental actions that harm investments but
which are not covered by other more specific standards of
protection.”99 Relevant factors for finding a FET violation include:
“(1) ‘whether the State has failed to offer a stable and predictable
legal framework;’ (2) ‘whether the State made specific
representations to the investor;’ (3) ‘whether due process has been
denied to the investor;’ (4) ‘whether there is an absence of
transparency in the legal procedure or in actions of the State;’ (5)
‘whether there has been harassment, coercion, abuse of power or
other bad faith conduct by the host State;’ and (6) ‘whether any of the
actions of the State can be labeled as arbitrary, discriminatory or
inconsistent.”100 The idea is that if a State action violates the FET as
it relates to the investment, which can include domestic contracts,
then investors are entitled to a remedy before ICSID.101
In terms of protective power, the FET surpasses umbrella
respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party.” Id. at ¶ 97.
95. SGS v. Pakistan, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 161.
96. Id.
97. See generally SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Rep. of Pak.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406
(2005).
98. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 258-61 (2015).
99. Andrey v. Kuznetsov, The Limits of Contractual Stabilization Clauses for Protecting
International Oil and Gas Investments Examined Through the Prism of the Sakhalin-2PSA:
Mandatory Law, the Umbrella Clause, and the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 22
Williamette J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 223, 254 (2015).
100. Id. at 254-55; See Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18,
Decision on Jurisdiction, P 284 (Jan. 14, 2010).
101. See Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18 at P 284.
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clauses because it is not limited to the literal observance of
contractual commitments.102 The FET protects domestic contracts
from even governmental depreciation of a contract’s value on
grounds ranging from discrimination to a failure to meet an investor’s
legitimate expectations.103
The Tecmed Case is the most frequently cited case that
interprets the FET, and it is also one of the most expansive
interpretations to date.104 The court in the Tecmed Case used the
“good faith” interpretation of FET from Mondev, which provided:
“To the modern eye, what is unfair and unequitable need not equate
with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular, a State may treat
foreign investment unfairly and inequitably without necessarily
acting in bad faith.”105 In light of this definition, the ICSID stated the
following:
[Fair and equitable treatment] requires the Contracting
Parties to provide to international investments
treatment that does not affect the basic expectations
that were taken into account by the foreign investor to
make the investment. The foreign investor expects the
host State to act in a consistent manner, free form
ambiguity and totally transparent in its relation with
the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand
any and all rules and regulations that will govern its
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant
policies and administrative practices or directives, to
be able to plan its investment and comply with such
regulation.106
Under the Tecmed Case, the FET protects the investor’s
legitimate expectations, which entails the need for consistency, nonarbitrariness, freedom from ambiguity, and “total transparency,” as
well as compensation for the deprivation of the investment.107
Though FET interpretations tend to grant it high substantive
protections, ICSID does not always immediately defer to that broad
102. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 259 (2015).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 265; see generally Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 23, 2003).
105. Tecmed, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 at ¶ 153-54; see Mondev Int’l Ltd. v.
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 116 (Oct. 11, 2002).
106. Tecmed, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 at ¶ 154
107. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 266 (2015).
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interpretation.108 For example, in CMS Gas v. Argentina, the tribunal
took a more cautious approach in interpreting the FET.109 While
CMS explicitly cited Tecmed in their argument, ICSID also looked to
the contours of the BIT itself, commonalities among other BITs, and
commonalities among prior ICSID cases in its reasoning.110
Specifically, ICSID reasoned that the FET calls for a stable legal and
business environment because the BIT’s preamble envision that the
FET is desirable “to maintain a stable framework for investments and
maximize effective use of economic resources.”111 Additionally,
ICSID reasoned that a significant number of BITs “unequivocally
show” that the FET is “inseparable from stability and predictability”
and that many “arbitral decisions and scholarly writings point in the
same direction.”112 Sure enough, ICSID does cite to the Tecmed
Case, but not before going further to look to precedent and
contextualizing the FET within this specific dispute.113
Regardless of whether corporations use FET or umbrella clauses
to internationalize domestic contracts, the reasons for using either
contractual strategy are similar—investors are acting to protect their
investments.114
3. How MNCs Use Internationalized Contracts
Generally, the internationalized contract arises from a domestic
agreement that imposes substantial risks for the investor.115 The
duties involved for these contracts can include the exploration,
extraction, and sale of a state’s natural resources, the construction of
fundamental infrastructure, and the operation of utilities.116 These
domestic contracts entail some temporary transfer of the state’s
sovereign prerogatives to the MNC.117 There is an expectation that
these contracts will benefit the economy of the host State in a
meaningful way.118 Given such high-stakes-investments, foreign
investors readily seek compulsory arbitration to resolve any major

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award at ¶¶ 279-81.
Id. at ¶¶ 273-76.
Id. at ¶ 273.
Id. at ¶ 276.
Id. at ¶ 279.
Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 250-51 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id. at 250-51.

MARQUINA (DO NOT DELETE)

244

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

2/21/21 1:16 PM

[Vol. 35:230

grievances they may have against a state.119
D. Populism
Globalization and the growing role of international institutions
in investor-state affairs generated some populist backlash.120
Populism is an “ideology that considers society to be ultimately
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics
should be an expression of the . . . general will of the people.”121
Despite this dichotomy, populists typically distinguish “pure people”
from other groups, such as immigrants, ethnic or racial minorities,
criminals, or some other group that is “singled out as undeserving in
a specific national context.”122 This division means that populists, in
practice, divide society into three groups—the elite, the majority, and
the minority.123 Populist leaders focus heavily on the principle that
the people should rule, and these leaders claim legitimacy on the
grounds that they speak for the people.124 Populism fights against
globalization in ways that seeks to limit the scope of investor-state
relations.125 If the sovereignty is the normative paradigm that governs
international law and foreign-investor-based concerns gave rise to
mechanisms permitting the internationalized contract, then populism
is the sovereign response that criticizes that “solution” as going too
far.126
Populism in any given State is in large part influenced by how
globalization affected that State.127 Globalization greatly expanded
opportunities for exporters, MNCs, investors, and international
119. Id. at 250.
120. Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON
POLITICS, 1 (June 20, 2019), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridgecore/content/view/22D6468FD3316BB74A63BAD7BBAE8E5C/S1537592719000975a.pdf/
populism_and_backlashes_against_international_courts.pdf. For the purposes of this article,
a backlash is a government action that attempts to curb or reverse the authority of an
international court. Id. at 2.
121. Id. at 5.
122. Id. at 1.
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id. at 5-6.
125. See Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON
POL., 1-4 (June 20, 2019), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridgecore/content/view/22D6468FD3316BB74A63BAD7BBAE8E5C/S1537592719000975a.pdf/
populism_and_backlashes_against_international_courts.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Dani Rodrick, Populism and the economics of globalization, J. INT. BUS. POLICY, 2,
(Dec.
2018),
https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/danirodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf.
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banks, and professional classes to take advantage of larger markets.128
In doing so, globalization decreased global inequality by helping poor
countries, such as China, adapt to changing markets and international
trade to spur growth and reduce poverty.129 However, globalization
also increased domestic inequalities by creating several wedges in
society between capital and labor, skilled and unskilled workers,
employers and employees, globally mobile professionals and local
producers, and elites and ordinary people.130 Those wedges drew the
ire of a growing populist ideology because populists felt that the rules
for international market competition were unfair and MNCs and
foreigners were taking advantage of that unfair system.131 Populist
leaders can more easily mobilize along ethno-national or cultural
lines when globalization becomes salient in the form of immigration
and refugees.132 On the other hand, populists may mobilize around
socioeconomic class lines when globalization takes the form of trade,
finance, and foreign investment.133 In essence, populist movements
provide narratives that motivate political mobilization around
common concerns, or the “enemies of the people.”134 Therefore,
populism is ultimately a question of how States frame their response
to globalization.135
III. ANALYSIS
State voices are clear regarding the internationalized contract:
they go too far and MNCs should no longer be able to leverage them
as tools against sovereignty.136 To their credit, States properly point
out that only foreign investors may access ISDS, which makes
arbitrations under BITs seem one-sided.137 However, these criticisms
of the internationalized contract and its enforcement undermine its
limited applicability and status as an insecure doctrine.138 Despite
these dubious merits of populist sentiments, the backlash remains and
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2.
133. Dani Rodrick, Populism and the economics of globalization, J. INT. BUS. POLICY, 2,
(Dec.
2018),
https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/danirodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf.
134. Id. at 13.
135. Id.
136. Infra Part III(A).
137. Id.
138. Infra Part III(C).
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any further action against BITs, ISDS, and ICSID, suggest that the
internationalized contract’s days are numbered.139
A. The Reason States Are Upset
The degree to which internationalized contracts grant MNCs
access to tribunals also counteracts populist principles of sovereignty
and skepticism of corporate power over the people.140
The
uniqueness of the internationalized contract lies in the sheer
flexibility and degree of access that MNCs have to international
tribunals and remedies through a purely domestic vehicle.141 While
access to ISDS in ICSID is commonplace with BITs at a purely
international, or horizontal, level, the internationalized contract goes
one step further by accomplishing the same result by elevating purely
domestic affairs to the international stage in a vertical manner.142
Internationalized contracts, unlike domestic contracts, occupy a
hierarchical position outside and above the entire domestic legal
order.143 This is because the breach of an internationalized contract
becomes a treaty violation, which comes within the jurisdiction of
judicial bodies like ICSID.144 The governing core principle behind
this institutional interest is that domestic law cannot excuse a state’s
violation of its international obligations nor its duty to compensate.145
By haling states to institutions like ICSID, MNCs unilaterally force
states to obey their obligations at a domestic level, run the risk of
compulsory arbitration to enforce the violated agreement, or abandon
the ISDS system entirely.146 From the populist perspective, the voice
of the people, in this case the sovereign State, is shut down by outside
forces that fundamental exceed domestic control.147
139. Infra Part III(D).
140. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 243-44
(2015).
141. See id. at 240-44.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 240.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 241; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, 1969 (“A party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty.”).
146. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 251 (2015).
147. Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON
POL., 1, 7 (June 20, 2019) (discussing that it is easier for populists to use sovereignty-based
arguments to attack foreign institutions adjudicating domestic matters). But see Emily
Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better Alternative?, 43 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 639, 640 (2018) (discussing that States adopted ISDS because MNCs feared that
domestic courts within a sovereign host State would not fairly hear their grievances
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That populist perspective is exacerbated by the internationalized
contract’s insulation from all forms of domestic public law, ranging
from environmental and public health to management of national
emergencies.148 MNCs may seek remedies for small infractions, such
as national regulations that abrogate the contract, materially breach it,
or even significantly depreciate its value.149 Thus, internationalized
contract doctrine becomes a public lawmaking deterrence against
states that may otherwise elect to enact laws that may risk violating
the contract in question.150 In doing so, MNCs directly affect not only
international law, but also domestic law of a given state, which runs
afoul the populist principles that reject “outside” voices from
influencing internal affairs in a meaningful way.151
B. Populist Backlash
Tangible examples of populist backlash against the
internationalized contract doctrines includes States criticizing ISDS
and ICSID, as well as seeking potential alternatives to both.152 In
2016, the European Union Parliament adopted a series of
recommendations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (“TTIP”), which included an amendment that sought to
replace ISDS with a new system entirely.153 The amendment called
for a system that was “subject to democratic principles and scrutiny”
that requires “publicly appointed, independent professional judges in
public hearings.”154 The goal of this “European Commission’s
Investment Court System” is to replace ISDS over time and “further
increase the efficiency, consistency, and legitimacy of the
international investment dispute resolution system.”155 Presumably,
the internationalized contract cannot survive in a domestic regime
whose purpose is to balance a dispute resolution system which
maintained strong international protections for foreign investments—

regarding international investments).
148. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 243 (2015).
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Michael Waibel et al., The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions
and Reality 8 (Jan. 2001) (working paper) (on file with the Peter A. Allard Sch. L. Univ.
British
Colum.),
https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=fac_pubs.
153. Michael D. Nolan, Challenges To The Credibility Of The Investor-State Arbitration
System, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 429, 436 (2016).
154. Id. at 436-37.
155. Id. at 437.
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a core aspect of the internationalization doctrine.156 In summation,
the European Union perceives that the manner in which MNCs use
ISDS is unfair to the State and thus created a system under its own
regime that fell in line with populist concepts of fairness.157
The European Commission’s backlash also challenged the
legitimacy of ICSID as a whole.158 In Micula v. Romania, the Micula
brothers brought a claim in ICSID against Romania under the
Sweden-Romanian BIT after Romania withdrew economic incentives
that harmed the brothers’ business.159
With the European
Commission as an amicus curiae, Romania argued that ICSID should
deny jurisdiction because Romania changed its laws to comply with
European Union competition law when it acceded to the EU.160
However, ICSID rejected the argument and issued an award for the
Micula brothers with an accompanying order for Romania to pay
$250 million compensation.161 However, in May 2014, the European
Commission issued an injunction to prevent Romania from honoring
the ICSID award.162
After an investigation, the European
Commission enjoined Romania from honoring the award on the
ground that it infringed European Union law and ordered Romania to
recover any money already paid.163 By issuing an injunction, the
European Union’s populist sentiments directly undermined ICSID’s
power that treats all awards as final judgments within the individual
signatory States’ domestic courts.164
Latin American countries mirrored Europe’s populist
perceptions of unfairness in the ISDS and ICSID systems.165 In 2007,
Bolivia withdrew from the ICSID after submitting a Notice under
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See generally Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, (Dec.
11, 2013).
160. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, ¶ 40-41, (Sept. 24, 2008).
161. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award, ¶ 1329, (Dec. 11,
2013).
162. Michael D. Nolan, Challenges To The Credibility Of The Investor-State Arbitration
System, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 429, 437-38 (2016).
163. Id. The Miculas sought relief in the General Court of the European Union, which
overturned the European Commission’s injunction. See generally T‑624/15, European Foods
et al. v. Comm’n, 2019 E.C.R. II-423. However, this case is currently subject to appeal, so
the final outcome is still pending.
164. Michael D. Nolan, Challenges To The Credibility Of The Investor-State Arbitration
System, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 429, 438 (2016).
165. Id. at 432.
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Article 71 of the ICSID Convention.166 Bolivian President Evo
Morales stated that “Governments from Latin America and I think all
over the world never win the cases. The transnationals always
win.”167 Then, Ecuador and Venezuela withdrew from ICSID in 2009
and 2012, respectively.168 Since that time, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela terminated some of their existing BITs and all three have
not signed any new investment agreements.169 These States were
motivated by the sentiment that foreign investments “promote
imperialism and hinders the distribution of benefits from natural
resources to the people.”170 While populism did not eliminate the
ISDS and ICSID systems, it limited their scope in States that took
political action against them.171
C. Are Internationalized Contracts Really So Bad?
Despite the breadth and power of internationalized contracts,
their reach is limited by the practical need for an underlying treaty.172
Moreover, other private entities, such as people and domestic
organizations, do not have the same flexibility as MNCs to treaty
shop for more expansive opportunities to hale States into ISDS.173
1. Treaties – The Lifeblood of Internationalized Contracts
A key element in “internationalizing” contracts is the use of
treaties as a necessary catalyst for international effect.174 By
considering domestic contracts as “investments” under umbrella
terms, treaties do the necessary legwork that gives corporations the
right to bring states into international tribunals for violating domestic
contracts or even just depreciating their value.175 However, unless a
166. Id.
167. Id. at 433.
168. Id. at 432. A 2008 empirical study by Washington and Lee University Associate
Professor of Law Susan Frack revealed that governments won 57.7% of investment treaty
cases whereas investors prevailed in only 38.5% of cases. Id. at 433. While the factual
correctness of individual State populist responses to globalization is outside the scope of this
article, it should be noted that feelings of unfairness regarding international tribunals is
sufficient to motivate populist political responses. Id. at 432-33.
169. See id. at 432.
170. Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes against International Courts, PERSP. ON
POL., 1, 9 (June 20, 2019).
171. See Michael D. Nolan, Challenges To The Credibility Of The Investor-State
Arbitration System, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 429, 432 (2016).
172. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 245 (2015).
173. Id. at 275-80.
174. See id. at 275-80.
175. Id.
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treaty is ratified by at least two States, the domestic contract lacks the
vehicle to gain international power.176 By including umbrella terms
and FET, the BITs themselves provide for ISDS in ICSID and, by
extension the internationalized contract.177 However, even the
presence of a BIT is not enough because a private party must still be
able to access that treaty.178
2. Treaty Shopping, Nationality, and Non-Multinational
Corporation Entities
Another limit in “internationalizing” contracts is the inherent
need for fluid nationality in relation to a relevant treaty.179 While
States view the internationalized contract as undermining
sovereignty, the doctrine is still meaningfully limited by sovereignfocused realities, such as nationality.180 A BIT’s aegis only covers
investments that relate to its signatory nations, which requires any
MNC seeking relief under that BIT to acquire the nationality of one
of those States.181 MNCs have fluid nationality in the sense that their
several subsidiaries and potential acquisitions permit them to
effectively gain the nationality of any State they choose in order to
use a particular treaty.182 This fluid nationality allows MNCs to treaty
shop to maximize their chances of finding a mechanism to force
States into ISDS before ICSID in order to enforce domestic
agreements.183 However, non-MNC entities do not have this option
as readily available because people and domestic organizations are
usually bound to a single State.184 Moreover, some MNCs may not
have the necessary resources to change their nationality beyond the
ones they currently have, which limits the scope of their treaty
shopping.185
While these limitations may suggest that the
176. Supra Part II(C).
177. Id.
178. Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the Reciprocal Protection of Foreign
Investment, 24 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 255, 257-58 (1994) (explaining that BITs set substantive
rules between two State parties and their respective investors).
179. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 275-80
(2015).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. But see Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3,
Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005). In this case, an
American MNC, Bechtel, owned a Cayman Island subsidiary that entered into an agreement
with that subsidiary. Id. ¶ 73. However, civil unrest caused Bolivia to terminate the
agreement, just five months into the forty-year contract. Id. ¶ 8. Bechtel successfully gained
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internationalized contract is far less threatening to State sovereignty
than populist sentiments may argue, the doctrine remains at risk of
disappearing in the face of a continued populist assault.186
D. The Future of the Internationalized Contract in the Face of
Populism
The sovereign response to the internationalized contract is not
kind.187 The main tool for internationalizing contracts—BITs—faced
populist resistance because of State distrust in ISDS’s ability to
appropriately resolve investment disputes.188 Some countries outright
reject the use of ISDS in their investment treaties.189 Australia stated
that it will not support ISDS in future trade agreements.190 Brazil
refuses to sign trade agreements that contain ISDS.191 South Africa
and India stated that they will withdraw from treaties with ISDS
clauses.192 Opponents of ISDS argue that the FET standard is overly
broad and should be properly defined through clearer language in
future BITs to promote predictability.193 Similarly, others suggest
delineating specific types of claims that investors can bring under
ISDS, such as “discrimination and expropriation and clarify that all
other disputes are to be brought to the domestic court system of the
State.”194 Others still suggest that BITs should require foreign
investors to exhaust all local remedies before they seek ISDS.195
Though internationalized contracts remain intact today by virtue of
ISDS, opponents are clear that they feel that it limits State
sovereignty.196
access to ISDS in ICSID through a treaty between Bolivia and the Netherlands by shifting its
Cayman Island subsidiary’s shares to Bechtel’s Dutch subsidiary. Id. ¶¶ 68, 182.
186. Infra Part III(D).
187. See Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better
Alternative?, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 658 (2018).
188. Id. at 659.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 659-60.
191. Id. at 659.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 659-60.
195. Id. at 660.
196. Id. The European Union voted in favor of the Transatlantic Trade Partnership, an
investment agreement between the United States and the EU, on the condition that ISDS was
replaced with a new system to resolve international investment disputes—the Investment
Court System. Id. The concern was that ISDS was not public or transparent, corporations
were not subject to public law, and that the interests of foreign investors began to supersede
public interest. Id.; but see Nikolaj Nielsen, TTIP Investor Court Illegal, Say German
Judges, EU OBSERVER (Feb. 16, 2016, 9:23 AM), https://euobserver.com/economic/132295.
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Despite these potentially far-reaching changes, there are reasons
to question the populist sentiment that the internationalized contract
undermines sovereignty.197 Though criticized as asymmetrical, ISDS
still permits host states to bring counterclaims against MNCs.198
Moreover, populist responses neglect that States, as hosts, inherently
have great sovereign authority to police transactions within their
borders.199 Additionally, ostracizing foreign investors, ISDS, and
ICSID as the “other” does not necessarily justify the belief that
domestic courts are better suited to resolve foreign investment
disputes.200 The populist concern that MNCs go too far seems
dubious when the internationalized contract itself is deeply in flux,
which leads to unreliable results for the MNC pursuing arbitration
before ICSID.201
Developing or poorer countries have an incentive to sign BITs to
promote foreign investment, which increases capital and associated
technologies that flows to their territories.202 If States wish to limit or
even withdraw from BITs or ISDS, they necessarily remove the
international protections that MNCs relied upon to reduce the risks
for transnational investments.203 If the international enforcement
mechanism is removed, MNCs naturally have far less incentive to
invest in a host State that no longer wishes to independently protect
the MNC’s investment interests.204 BITs, by their nature, “have the
effect of stabilizing a country’s investment policy and its legal and
contractual commitments to individual foreign investors.”205 By
abdicating these international obligations, States elect to forgo any

The Germane Association of Magistrates criticized the EU’s suggestion as unlawful, and
America wishes to retain the ISDS system.
197. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 268 (2009).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. But see Michael D. Nolan, Challenges to the Credibility of the Investor-State
Arbitration System, 5 AM. UNIV. BUS. L. REV. 429 (2018) (raising questions about neutrality
of arbitrators in ICSID, who are increasingly filing dissenting opinions, almost 100% of
which are in favor of the party that appointed the dissenting arbitrator).
201. Supra Part III(C).
202. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do Bits Really Work?: An Evaluation
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 77
(2005).
203. See id. at 95 (“The basic working assumption upon which BITs rest is that clear and
enforceable rules that protect foreign investors reduce risk, and a reduction in risk promotes
investment.”).
204. See id.
205. Id. at 96.
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benefit they once drew from those investors.206
Regardless of the merits behind populist sentiments, States are
clear that they are not happy.207 These populist proposals, if
implemented, may spell the death knell of the internationalization
doctrine.208 If States begin actively negotiating for clearer language
in their BITs, MNCs cannot rely on umbrella clauses or the FET
standard to elevate mere contractual violations to the level of a treaty
violation.209 By stripping away the vagueness that gave rise to the
internationalized contract, States could effectively remove subjectmatter jurisdiction from ICSID to ever entertain these suits again.210
Furthermore, if States outright abandon ISDS as a dispute resolution
mechanism, MNCs may likely be forced to return to using the
domestic courts of their host state, much like the earliest foreign
investors that came before them.211 Neither option is favorable, but
because BITs require sovereign consent, even MNCs with fluid
nationality may not be able to rely on the internationalized contract
for much longer.212
IV. CONCLUSION
The status of the internationalized contract is symptomatic of the
continued health of broad BITs and ISDS as a whole.213 The
internationalized contract is based on a doctrine that, though
potentially robust, is consistently in flux, which renders it unreliable
in practice.214 Despite that unreliability, a galvanized populist
sentiment poses a significant risk to the doctrine with more States
seeking to limit or withdraw from BITs and ISDS.215 If States choose
to still sign BITs, they may reaffirm their sovereignty by drafting
narrower FET standards and umbrella clauses, which may mark the
demise of the internationalized contract.216 With BITs rendered
206. See id.
207. See Emily Osmanski, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is There a Better
Alternative?, 43 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 660 (2018).
208. See id. at 659 (discussing methods to reduce the scope of BITs, which directly limits
internationalization doctrine).
209. Id. (expressing that the FET standing is too broad and lacks predictability).
210. See id. at 639.
211. See id. at 658 (discussing ideas to reform ISDS include refining ISDS to proposing a
completely new forum).
212. See id.
213. Supra Part II(C).
214. Supra Part III(C).
215. Supra Part II(D).
216. Supra Part III(D).

MARQUINA (DO NOT DELETE)

254

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

2/21/21 1:16 PM

[Vol. 35:230

useless in enforcing domestic contracts, MNCs may be forced to play
by sovereign rules within domestic courts.217 Whether foreign
investors retaliate to these limitations—and whether populist States
even care—remains to be seen.218 However, the populist State
response is obvious: the internationalized contract and its underlying
mechanisms are in trouble.219
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219. Supra Part III(A).

